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ABSTRACT: Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field 
dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus 
exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of 
whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in the epistemic evaluation of arguments. 
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[…] it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a 
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. (Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, Bk1 Ch. 3; 1094b 12-27) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In addition to his Data-Warrant-Claim theory of argument structure and the 
accompanying idea that the acceptability of warrants is a centerpiece of argument 
evaluation, Toulmin’s notion of argument fields contributes prominently to his legacy in 
argumentation studies. Indeed it is primarily through the notion of field dependency—
that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next—that Toulmin’s 
model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures. Yet, the nature and foundations of 
argument fields is poorly understood, and a matter about which there remains little or no 
consensus. Further, unlike the time in which Toulmin introduced the notion of fields, the 
theses of pragmatism—that standards of good argument ought to be relative to the goals 
of argumentation (or, that a good argument is one that achieves its purpose)—and 
situationalism—that the standards of good argument ought to be situationally 
appropriate—are now more generally accepted by argument theorists and epistemologists 
alike. This raises the question of whether the notion of field has any useful role to play in 
evaluative theories of argument. 
 In this paper I will argue that evaluative theories of argument are better off 
without the notion of fields. While fields have embedded within them several important 
 
* This paper builds upon the groundwork of a paper I presented in Amsterdam, 2002 and develops an 
argument I first presented at the Alta Summer Conference on Argumentation, 2007.  
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notions that will aid in the evaluation of arguments, they also lead to a relativism best 
avoided.  
 
2. FIELD DEPENDENCY AND NORMATIVE PLURALISM 
 
From an epistemological perspective, the most significant feature of argument fields is 
the thesis of field-dependency. Toulmin distinguished those features of arguments that are 
field invariant from those that are field dependent. The former include similarities of 
procedure and form which “hold good throughout a wide range of fields” (2003, p. 21) 
such as the D-W-C structural form of arguments and the force of certain modal terms, 
while the latter encompasses components of the argument such as its type of data and 
backing as well as the evaluative criteria of pertaining to it. 
Thus, a consequence of field-dependency is normative pluralism. Argument 
features like warrant, backing and the criteria used to employ logical terms are 
irreducibly normative features of argument. They capture the evidentiary and justificatory 
relations constitutive of ‘good reasons’ and in so doing, embody the canons and standards 
by which arguments are properly evaluated. Yet, these are the very features of argument 
which vary from one field to the next. So, the controversial aspect of the field-
dependency thesis is normative pluralism. 
Contrary to the aspirations of the formal logicians, there cannot be a single, 
universal and abstract model of all justification and hence of (good) arguments. Thus, one 
key thesis of theoretical import in Toulmin’s program is the claim that “we must judge 
each field of substantial arguments by its own relevant standards” (2003, p. 216). Indeed, 
Toulmin (2003, p. 235) claims that validity itself is a field-dependent property of 
arguments.  
 
What has to be recognized first is that validity is an intra-field, not an inter-field notion. 
Arguments within any field can be judged by standards appropriate within that field, and some 
will fall short; but it must be expected that the standards will be field-dependent, and that the 
merits to be demanded of an argument in one field will be found to be absent (in the nature of 
things) from entirely meritorious arguments in another.  
 
It is because arguments cannot all be evaluated by the same set of standards and norms 
that the theorist must appreciate the nature, boundaries, and inner structure of argument 
fields. Fields are, as it were, the natural kinds of evidentiary relations, and it is for this 
reason that fields capture something fundamental about the very nature of justification. 
(Godden 2003, p. 370). 
 
3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIVISM 
 
A problem with the ideas of normative pluralism and field-dependency is that together 
they seem readily to lead to a full-bodied relativism. A useful way of defining 
epistemological relativism can be found in Boghossian’s (2006, p. 2) Doctrine of Equal 
Validity: 
 
Equal Validity: There are many different, yet “equally valid” ways of knowing the world […] 
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It would seem that Toulmin’s view could easily result in the doctrine of equal validity. In 
the first place, normative pluralism entails that a given argument (understood as a 
premise-conclusion set, or a D-W-C collection of propositions) could be valid in one field 
and invalid in another. Thus, a conclusion could be acceptable in one field, but 
unacceptable in another. So far, this seems to be an unobjectionable and true descriptive 
claim about what arguers in different fields might judge to be acceptable.  
But, when combined with the claim that all evaluative standards are themselves 
field-dependent, it seems that there is no way of ranking, comparing or otherwise 
evaluating the different and conflicting judgements of validity and acceptability. Rather, 
it seems that the rational judge is only able to offer verdicts of the following sorts: the 
argument is valid in field-A but invalid in field-B,1 or according to my field-dependent 
standards the argument is (in)valid—but according to your equally field-dependent 
standards it might well be valid, or finally, according to some field-dependent standard 
the standards of field-A are better than those of field-B and so field-A judgements are 
preferable to field-B judgements—but again, according to your equally field-dependent 
standards the opposite might be so. In none of these judgements is one able to 
categorically claim that some arguments are simply invalid, some conclusions are simply 
unacceptable, or some judgements are plainly more acceptable than others. Being 
deprived of any field-independent standard of measure or comparison, the rational judge 
is further compelled to concede that judgements made in fields other than his own cannot 
objectively be deemed to be any better or worse than his own. Thus, we have landed in 
the realm of equal-validity.  
For reasons that I won’t explore in this paper, but which have been set out 
extensively and convincingly by authors such as Siegel (1987) and Boghossian (2006) I 
take it that such a view is unacceptable. Thus, the epistemologist must either find some 
account of fields that does not lead to such a relativism, or abandon them entirely. 
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that, while there are valuable lessons to 
drawn from Toulmin’s ideas about fields, evaluative theories of argument will best get by 
without them. 
 
4. THE NATURE OF FIELDS 
 
Recently, Roland (2008, pp. 240-242) has provided a useful inventory of the existing 
accounts of the nature of fields, which summarize (and amend slightly) as follows. 
 
1. Ontological: Fields are subject matter domains (and covary with ontological 
differences). (Klumpp 1981, p. 50)  
2. Anthropological: Fields are communities of arguers or audiences (and covary 
with human differences). (McKerrow 1980; Willard 1981, p. 24) 
                                                 
1 Importantly, as much as Toulmin (e.g., Toulmin 2006) rather ignored the relativistic consequences of his 
field-theory, it is seems clear that Toulmin would never embrace a relativism about facts. For example, the 
fact that argument A justifies claim C in field F is not itself field dependent fact. There is nothing in 
Toulmin to suggest that he views the facts giving rise to the data in some field or other as being field 
dependent. Rather, the limit of Toulmin’s exposure to relativism seems to be about a special class of 
epistemic facts, eg., about whether argument A justifies claim C. 
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3. Linguistic: Fields are domains of discourse (and covary with linguistic or 
conceptual differences). (i) Epistemological: e.g., Kneupper’s (1981, p. 81) 
“knowledge structures” and Wenzel’s (1982, p. 204) “the propositional 
context of a disciplined rational enterprise with an epistemological purpose.” 
(ii) Logical: (Godden 2003)  
4. Sociological / Psychological: Fields are (a) sociological or (b) psychological 
categories (and covary with human or social or psychological differences). (i) 
Disciplinary: (Kneupper 1981; Klumpp 1981); (ii) Symbolic Structures: e.g., 
Gronbeck’s (1981, p. 15) “collections of communicative rules”; (iii) Purely 
Psychological: Willard (1981) 
5. Pragmatic: Fields are practices (which covary according to their pragmatic 
utility in problem-solving). (Roland 1981, 1982; Wenzel 1982; Hanson 1989)  
 
While Roland (2008) argues that these different approaches are complementary rather 
than in competition with each other, it is not clear that this amalgamative approach2 helps 
to solve the epistemological problems presented by many of the characterizations of 
fields here.  
 If the evaluative properties of arguments in fact depend on any of the 
psychological, sociological, anthropological, disciplinary, conceptual, linguistic, or 
symbolic, features of arguments then it seems that there is little prospect of avoiding the 
problem of equal validity. (So, combining them won’t help either.) Let’s consider a 
couple of examples.3 If fields covary with audiences (NB: not the knowledge states of 
different audiences! but simply the audiences themselves) then what is a valid—not 
effective or persuasive—argument to one audience need not be valid for a different 
audience. Thus, that one audience finds an argument to be valid while another does not 
marks the final assessment that an evaluative theory of argument can give. Without any 
further measure to compare or evaluate them, each of these different findings must be 
equally valid. 
Take a second example: suppose that fields are disciplinary. At first glace, the 
idea that the probative merits of an argument, or the acceptability of a claim, can vary 
from one discipline to the next seems to make some good sense. An argument about the 
chemical composition of a rock sample might be quite adequate in geology and quite 
inadequate in gemology. Yet should this be the final word on how the relative merits of 
arguments can be evaluated? Are there not some arguments of which we want to say that 
they are (no) good no good no matter what discipline belong to or are offered in? Do we 
really want to say that the prophecies of an astrologer are based on astrologically good 
arguments and leave it at that?  
 Put another way, one of the evaluative properties of arguments that is of 
paramount significance from an epistemological point of view is whether their premises 
provide good reasons for their conclusions. That is to say, whether, and to what degree, 
the truth of their premises establishes or demonstrates the truth—or likelihood—of their 
                                                 
2 It might be remarked that Toulmin himself seems quite content with this amalgamative approach to the 
nature of fields. 
3 For reasons that will become clear below, I do not reject the pragmatic approach just listed. Instead, I 
claim that the virtues of a pragmatic approach to argument assessment can be realized without invoking the 
problematic rubric of argument fields. 
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conclusions. The epistemic merits of an argument depend on whether, and to what 
degree, its premises conduct truth to its conclusion. Surely, in some disciplines (geology) 
we can accept a greater margin of error than in others (gemology). Thus different 
disciplines can adopt strict or lax standards according to their purposes. Yet, there are 
some arguments which always conduct truth from premises to conclusions, and the merits 
of such arguments should be recognized in every discipline. Similarly, there are other 
arguments which entirely fail to conduct truth from premises to conclusions. It does not 
approbate such arguments to say that they are in common circulation in some discipline, 
culture, practice or language game.  
 
An Attempt to Rescue Fields from Relativism 
 
Bermejo-Luque (2006) has recently argued that Toulminean fields do not entail 
epistemological relativism. She does this by focusing on the good idea that field- 
dependency pertains to the modality of claims: the criteria for the application of a modal 
term is field-dependent, while the force of a modal term is field-invariant. As she (2006, 
p. 72) puts it, for Toulmin “to argue is to try to establish the modality of a claim” and  
 
to evaluate an argument is to determine which modal qualification is appropriate for the claim, 
given the reason adduced for it, or whether the modal qualification provided by the arguer is 
correct or not. 
 
 As much as I applaud and agree with Bermejo-Luque’s overall approach, I don’t 
think that it saves Toulmin’s view from the dangers of relativism. There are two main 
problems with this type of argument. First, it is not at all clear that the force of modal 
qualifiers really is field-invariant. For example, Toulmin describes the force of 
“impossible” as including “the implied injunction that something-or-other [i.e., some 
claim, p] has to be ruled out in this-or-that way for such-a-reason” and of “possible” as 
“[to] concede that it [again, some claim, p] has a right to be considered” (2003, p. 17). 
Yet, it is not clear that this entitlement to be considered, or ruling-out (obligation to 
exclude from consideration), really is invariant across fields. That something is 
technically or practically impossible does not mean that it should be ruled out from 
consideration in theoretical physics. Similarly, that something is logically possible does 
not mean that it merits consideration in a forensic or scientific investigation. Nor perhaps 
should its metaphysical impossibility exclude it from consideration in physics. Recall 
Kant’s argument that it is metaphysically impossible that space be non-Euclidian. 
Physicists did not, nor should they have, ruled this out in advancing their theories. That 
something is theoretically impossible might mean that we should change our theory, not 
refrain from considering it as a possibility. Thus, the force of modal terms is not invariant 
across fields. That something merits consideration or should be ruled out in one context 
does not mean that it merits consideration or should be ruled out in some other context. 
Perhaps, though, Toulmin means that the force of “physically impossible” is field 
invariant. Thus, that something is physically impossible does not mean that I should rule 
it out as a logical possibility. At this point, modal terms might well be field invariant, but 
it is no longer clear why we should accept that the criteria for establishing physical 
impossibility are field-dependent. Rather, it seems that every field is committed to the 
same criteria for establishing physical impossibility. Further, that different fields are 
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committed to different modal-criteria will be evidenced in that they treat the modal-force 
of claims differently. 
Toulmin’s claim concerning the difference between the criteria and force of 
modal terms seems to equivocate upon those modal terms. “Impossible” is interpreted as 
“impossibility simpliciter” when it comes to the field-dependency of the criteria and 
“physical impossibility” when it comes to the field-invariance of force. Sticking with the 
former, it seems that both force and criteria are field-dependent, while with the latter it 
seems that neither is field dependent.  
 A second problem arises when we note some additional ‘modalities’ of central 
interest when making and evaluating arguments: specifically truth and falsity. The claim 
that the force of “true” is field-dependent does not lead merely to the relativism of 
evaluative properties of argument, but to a full-blown relativism of all facts. Further, if 
the modalities of truth and falsity are field-dependent then claims across fields cannot 
even be compared. If field-A contains P amongst its truths, while field-B contains ~P, 
there is no genuine contradiction since P(field-A) is not a contradictory of ~P(field-B). 
To avoid the Doctrine of Equal Validity, the force of truth (as a modality) must be field-
independent. But if this is so, then the criteria for this modality cannot be field-dependent. 
 
5. LESSONS FROM TOULMIN 
 
Toulmin (1989, pp. 380-381) sought to re-humanize the study of argument by 
distinguishing the formal and functional elements of argument, and changing the subject 
matter of argument from a “string of propositions” to a “human interchange.” Many of 
the attempts to operationalize fields have sought to bring arguments closer to arguers as a 
way of finding more appropriate standards and means for evaluating them. In and of 
itself, this is a laudable project. Further, a number of useful insights can be drawn out of 
Toulmin’s ideas about fields. Predominant among these might be the following: 
 
1. normative pluralism: there are a number of non-equivalent, non-reducible 
standards of evidence against which inferences, including inferences used in 
arguments, can be measured / evaluated (Godden 2005) 
 
2. situationalism: the standard of evidence used to evaluate a situated inference 
should be situationally appropriate (Godden 2005) 
 
3. pragmatism: that standards of good argument ought to be relative to the goals 
of argumentation (or, a good argument is one which achieves its purpose)  
(Roland 2008)4 
 
Yet, if these are the kinds of lessons to be learned from Toulmin’s work, then it would 
seem that they can be implemented into workable normative theories of argument without 
any reliance on the problematic notion of fields whatsoever.  
                                                 
4 Notice that if normative pluralism is false, then pragmatism and situationalism are insignificant. The 
theses of pragmatism and situationalism are theses which guide rational actors in their selection of rational 
norms. If there are no normative options available, then guidelines for choices among them are not 
required. 
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6. CONCLUSION: DOING WITHOUT FIELDS 
 
If what I have said in the preceding pages is correct then it is epistemically desirable to 
dispense with the notion of fields when evaluating arguments. How might this be done? 
One answer is to draw upon another idea from Toulmin’s work: the warrant. Warrants, 
you will recall, are “general, hypothetical statements which can act as bridges [between 
datum and claim] and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits 
us” (2003, p. 91). 
 While Toulmin (2003, p. 93; 1992, p. 9) claimed that warrants are one of those 
field-dependent features of argument, recent work (primarily due to Hitchcock 1985, 
1998 and Pinto 2006)5 suggests that a robust and workable theory of warrants, suitable 
for the objective evaluation of argument, can be provided without reference to argument 
fields whatsoever. 
 A key feature of warrants is that they can be evaluated according to their truth 
conductivity or reliability.6 While measures are entirely objective, preventing the slide to 
relativism, they can be applied in such a way as to make them relative to an arguer’s 
goals or purposes, thus allowing for the situationalism and pragmatism that seem to 
follow as general mores of evaluation from Toulmin’s work.  
 
         Link to commentary 
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